

## THE MORAL PREMISES OF NUCLEAR WAR 1987

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### ABSTRACT

*We are often trapped in the preconceptions of a system of thought. The arms race is a moral issue with historical, social and psychological roots. In this paper I examine the thinking behind it: the myth of scientific expertise; the myth of the external present; the conceptual status of the 'other'; the consequences of defensiveness and its acceptable levels; the premise of mass genocide; the rights of children; the damage inflicted by undropped bombs; the harm inflicted by dual codes, and legitimate and illegitimate 'terrorism'.*

In discussions of nuclear strategy and defense we are in danger of being drawn into an insane technical debate about types of weaponry and the levels of casualties that might ensue from a nuclear exchange.

A great deal depends of course upon the prior assumptions about the amount of megatonnage unleashed in such an exchange. There is a welter of 'rational' scientific argument about these assumptions. One finds apparently sane people talking poker-faced of acceptable levels of damage, when they are referring to hundreds of millions of casualties.<sup>1</sup>

A recent study by SIPRI, an obscenarion for a nuclear exchange in the northern hemisphere (11,3 10 USSR missiles of 4,140 megatons against 12.840 US missiles of 3,510 megatons) estimates that within a day there would be 750 million dead and 340 million wounded. That is the scale of damage before the long-term effects of radiation, ecological damage and pestilence have even been considered. Such a possibility makes the Jewish Holocaust look like a festival celebrating the brotherhood of man. Like many at the time of the Second World War, we know that preparation for such a final solution are underway and many are willing partners in this global Treblinka (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1984).

The mere fact that we can even contemplate such horror is an extraordinary reflection on the emotional well-being of human kind. As MacLeish says knowledge without feeling is not knowledge, and can only lead to public irresponsibility and indifference, conceivably to ruin. When the fact is dissociated from the feel of the fact ... civilization is in danger'(in Grinspoon 1965, 126). Frequently, the fundamental moral issues of nuclear deterrence are concealed in arguments about levels of nuclear development, and in the extraordinary complexity of the strategic glossary. Grinspoon terms this propensity to seek refuge in expertise and facts 'used

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<sup>1</sup> For insane discourse see Scheer (1982) who talks about the long-term effects of radiation in the following way: "if you spread the genetic damage over tens of thousands of years you have done something very useful'.

by those working on peace research as well as by those making preparations for war' - intellectualism (Grinspoon, 1965, 123). Another closely associated psychological defense mechanism, connected with the cult of the expert and the myth of detached scientism, is 'isolation' the means by which emotion is separated from fact (Grinspoon, 1965: 126).

It is a grotesque error to get lost in the more complex debates about levels of armaments and the banal technical glossary of psiloads and megadeath and all the tactical euphemisms which serve to disguise the awesome prospects of the end of life on this planet.<sup>2</sup> Obedience to authority (Milgram, 1974) and surrender to expertise is at the heart of this anticipated tragedy. We must reject the role of the expert and embrace our emotions when it comes to rejecting nuclear weapons as a means of defence. There are no experts when it comes to nuclear disarmament (Ford, 1982). We should be extremely skeptical about scientific 'rationality' and knowledge.

There is a danger that such a conclusion might prove an overwhelming and intolerable burden to humankind and result in a failure to adapt or an increased resort to denial, rationalization (it's so terrible it will never be used) (Grinspoon, 1965), and displacement (hyperactivity in related spheres of discourse). There is no doubt that movies like 'Threads' and 'The Day After' frequently produce this kind of response. However I believe we must face up to the overwhelming reality of a nuclear exchange and set out to create the therapeutic environment whereby disarmament begins immediately. Each faint ray of hope of survival after nuclear war aids psychological defense mechanisms and heightens the unreality of protagonists of deterrence. The denial of nuclear realities contributes to the possibility of nuclear war. Everyone should realize there is absolutely no hope of life remaining on this planet after a nuclear war. There should be no illusions, no quibbling on the temperature of nuclear winter or the number of post-holocaust survivors. The stark reality of the end of all life on this planet should provide the motivation for an overwhelming desire to destroy such weapons forthwith. But to understand the notion of a therapeutic environment we must first ask how is it possible to have arrived at this present position of utter lunacy. For it is real madness to have to discuss these appalling possibilities.

## PREMISE OF INNATE AGGRESSION

It is important to consider this-question, however briefly, because our image of humankind to a large extent determines our worldview and our optimism concerning the arms race. It is often argued that people are naturally aggressive and that consequently war is inevitable. Even if true the connection between this proposition and the possibility of a reciprocal holocaust is tenuous, for we may be obliged to fight but not to destroy ourselves. Many writers have often sought to justify social hierarchy, dominance and war by myths of sociobiology. They build theories of human behaviour on an anthropomorphized natural world using highly selective accounts of animal behaviour. Such theories 'are demonstrably wrong' (Montagu 1978, 300). For example, our immediate relatives, the great apes, are extremely amiable.<sup>2</sup> There is little that can be adduced from studies of animal behaviour to suggest that there is a drive to war. Even in warlike societies it is necessary to resort to a wide variety of sanctions and inducements to persuade people to fight.

Psychological theories of war are prone to move from individual acts to collective facts, an illogical procedure at best. The gentle side of human nature is proven by the relative infrequency of violence when it might be most expected between familiars in intense everyday contact and intimacy.

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<sup>2</sup> See also Caplan(1978). There are other more complex functional and ecological theories of warfare see Vayda (1976), Carneiro, R. (1970), Schorr (1974

Even in these circumstances homicide is rare.<sup>3</sup> It might be legitimate to talk about an instinct of aggression in individual acts of violence. But violent emotions are socially constructed as evidenced by the many cultural reasons stimulating anger and violence. Each form of violence is culturally molded and constrained.<sup>4</sup>

Both ethological and psychological theories would presuppose a relatively fixed expression and incidence of warfare, but there has been a high degree of variation cross-culturally and, perhaps more crucially historically, within cultures. *'As an impulse, pugnacity is infinitely plastic. As a type of behaviour, fighting can be linked with an indefinitely wide range of cultural motives'* (Malinowski 1983: 86). Modern ethnography suggests that many early human groups lived in relative harmony with one another or at the very least in balanced hostility with raiding between groups and warfare being highly regulated. Many traditional societies have elaborate procedures for the avoidance of violence.<sup>5</sup> Amongst the most important of these is the principle of reciprocity within groups and hospitality between potentially hostile groups. Some peoples like Australian Aboriginals share common rural practices, a source of communication and friendly intercourse. Social relations between such groups are lubricated by complex mechanisms of exchange and ceremony. There are other means of channelling potential violence like song contests, potlatches and organized brawls; and there is a difference between communal and intertribal fights. Most fighting when it occurs takes place between members of the same tribal group.

In those societies, which practice feud, there are many internal control practices prior to full-scale violence breaking out. The feud itself contains strong elements of social control; and group responsibility, which limits the extent of violence. It is important to realize that the pursuit of vengeance is a conscious obligation separate from an unconscious instinct of aggression.

The plasticity of human violence is shown by an historical look at the evolution of war: weaponry and the rules of war: Evidence from preindustrial societies points to the lack of uniform expression of aggression both in individual acts and organized fighting. Primitive warfare comes closest in appearance to agonistic behaviour in animals, since it is often highly ritualized and remarkably different from modern warfare. But certain types of primitive warfare may serve religious or ecological purposes; as such they are forerunners of modern warfare.

Socialisation for aggression varies considering see Montagu (1978) and Kahnert et al (1983). As Malinowski (1973) points out educational power in many cultures is directed towards the elimination of violence and there are many examples of elaborate intertribal avoidance (1971-83). The definition of human nature varies considerably between and within cultures.

Malinowski makes a distinction between primitive and modern war saying that only when portable property and concentrated wealth appear war as we know it occur; 'war is an armed contest between two independent political units, by means of organized military force, in pursuit

National policy' (Malinowski, 1973). In Malinowski's terms, the prototype of modern warfare is organized violence between opposing groups of political and territorial purposes.

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<sup>3</sup> Even in violent prone societies evidence suggests complex social causes for violence see Brown (1969).

<sup>4</sup> The following discussion draws on Westermarck 1912, 327 ff. and Malinowski, B. (1973).

<sup>5</sup> Socialisation for aggression varies considering see Montagu (1978) and Kahnert et al (1983). As Malinowski (1973) points out educational power in many cultures is directed towards the elimination of violence and there are many examples of elaborate intertribal avoidance (1971-83). The definition of human nature varies considerably between and within cultures

Wright (1965:25) states that war, in the sense of a legal situation permitting groups to expand wealth and power by violence, began with civilization:

*Only among civilised people has war been an institution serving political and economic interests of the community, defined by a body of law which states the circumstances justifying its use, the procedures whereby it is begun and indeed, and the methods by which it is conducted.*

Wright (1965) follows Malinowski in restricting the definition of war to the organised pursuit of tribal policy. (In my view this does not necessarily stand up to close examination, although scale, and sophistication increase with centralization).

Otterbein in a study of 46 societies 'excluding peasant communities and modern nations' defines war as:

*armed combat between political communities. Armed combat, which is fighting with weapons, 'is performed by military organizations. When warfare occurs between political communities which are not culturally similar, this 'is referred to as external war. If there is more than one military organization within a political community, and these military organizations engage in armed combat, this is considered feuding or civil war, depending upon the scope of the conflict (Otterbein, 1970, 3).*

On the whole more centralized societies have more efficient military organisations, more hierarchy, initiate civil and external war more frequently and sustain heavier casualty rates.

Otterbein found that most societies fought for revenge or defense. In order of ascending cause in relation to centralization, defense, plunder prestige and control and causes of war with defense being one of the fundamental reasons for war, although it is frequently found in combination with the other reasons mentioned. There are some non-centralized societies who fight for none of these reasons. What emerges from this study is important to the main theme of my paper; defensiveness is a prime cause of war, and as Bodley (1976) points out, military sophistication is associated with increased incidence of warfare in primitive cultures and pre-industrial states. We might conclude from the data that the increased sophistication and defensiveness will provoke war rather than prevent it.

Another important feature of this research was the difficulty of defining the meaning of victory. The goals and outcomes of war Otterbein (1970) found to be largely indeterminate. (He finally decided to measure military success in terms of territorial expansion). This is borne out by a recent study of war in advanced societies which says that victors in a third of the many wars studied between 1816-1982 emerged with greater number of casualties.

Perhaps more ominous with regard to anachronistic nuclear thinking is the finding that 'initiators "win" in almost 70 percent of the interstate wars, and they sustain fewer battle deaths than their "victims" in 60 percent of the cases' (Small and Singer 1982: 294).

Warfare, in broad evolutionary perspective, has always submitted to rules, but over the centuries larger numbers of people have been drawn into its orbit. Further evidence for the non-instinctual nature of human violence and war is the way laws regulating violence between individuals differ culturally and historically and the way the rules of war have altered even within cultures. Only during the Second World War did we accept the notion of Blitzkrieg and the mass bombing of civilian populations. Prior to the Second World War the conventions excluding non-combatants were largely adhered to. This war saw a gradual acceptance of routine massacre of innocents:

*There was, therefore, for the public at large, no decisive moment of change; no point at which the political or military authorities declared their repudiation of the belief that the deliberate massacre of civilians, of women, children, of people and any others not engaged in combat, was not a legitimate means of waging wars. Rather, we slid into a new attitude, eased into it by slogans about 'total war' and 'there are no civilians nowadays'. No one said that we were committing crimes of just the kind that we had instanced proving Nazi barbarism (Dummett 1984, 31).*

This was ended with the unnecessary atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Townsend, 1984). Genocide and atomic war became accepted as potential instruments of national policy. Yet the rules of war would seemingly prohibit the use of nuclear weapons even in defense.<sup>6</sup> The Hague convention limits unnecessary suffering and uncontrolled damage to property. The Martens clause, used at the Nuremberg trials, refers to conventions of civilized behaviour, *'the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience'*. *The 1925 Geneva protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all the analogous liquids, materials or devices in addition to bacteriological methods of warfare.* (Blackaby et al., 1984:7). The 1949 Geneva Convention strictly limits, neutral power involvement. The Protocol of 1977 prohibited weapons causing *'widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment'* (Blackaby, 1984:8).

The sheer impact of even the smallest weapons and the nature of nuclear explosions makes the modern rules of war impossible to apply. The immediate damage to civilian life and property, the oxygen fires and the radioactive contamination immediately offends the rules of international law. Beyond this there are the long-term ecological and meteorological effects.

In sum, war is often less an example of natural aggressiveness than of altruism. It is possible that the high degree of altruism and cooperation required by human groups was at least as important a factor in social success coming to the fore in certain ecological and social contexts. It could be argued that war as a cultural invention conferred an evolutionary advantage. This may mean that warfare is an intrinsic part of cultural behaviour; however since it is cultural it is possible to modify or eliminate

Studies of war reveal its variability. They also suggest that far from evolution on from a state of savagery the reverse is true. Our evolution seems to be towards a state of unparalleled barbarity. Evidence suggests that we are doing our gentle simian forbears a great disservice in attributing to them the responsibility for the evils of our civilization.

Wars are fought in cold blood not under the direct impulse of aggression for religious reasons, patriotism, ideology and indoctrination, nationalism, imperialism and totalitarianism. Pressing the buttons to destroy the world is probably the least imaginable act of aggression.

All arguments about the rules of war, first strike and deterrence in relation to nuclear weapons are redundant because of the terminal character of nuclear war. Mass genocide is fundamentally immoral even if carried out in defense. It is of no comfort to know that millions of other children have perished in the holocaust. We should listen to the voices of the children of Hiroshima.

The puzzle remains how is it possible to have reached a stage in history where all rules of war have been cast aside? How can we contemplate

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<sup>6</sup> From *No-First- Use SPRI* 1984: 6 ff.

inflicting on ourselves in the name of defense the most unspeakable horrors imaginable? I suggest we must look at the phenomenon of projection and examine the way human beings regarded strangers and enemies and the way we attribute to them all kinds of nastiness.

## THE PREMISE OF EVIL

Each group sees itself as the centre of the universe, as the people and the nation. A consequence of this is that murder of a stranger is generally not as problematic as murder within the group. Many peoples regard the killing of a stranger as a prestigious act. There have been some notable exceptions like the central Australian Aborigines, the Veddahs and the Greenlanders. Sometimes strangers are at risk for religious reasons, for example the Mayas often fought to supply sacrificial victims for their guardian deities, satisfying their Gods at the same time as increasing their domain. In preindustrial society a stranger is often subject to special protection if only for a limited period. By and large 'primitive' societies with their rules of hospitality and avoidance, are much more civilized in their behaviour than 'advanced' societies. Even cannibalism has its advantages. Bertrand Russell once said that modern war might cease if we had to eat our victims.

Among many traditional holistic societies there exists a belief in witchcraft and sorcery. People in these societies think that illness and accidents are caused by personal malevolence, and there exist institutional means for diagnosis and cure. Primitive witchcraft was comparatively tame; although all kinds of events were attributed to human malevolence there existed the means to order and control it. Accusations of witchcraft were not necessarily directed towards outsiders.

In Europe the ideas about witchcraft and the conceptual status of the stranger developed differently. Early Christian thinkers totally condemned warfare. It was Saint Augustine who made it possible to take up arms on behalf of the state, although strict penance was often required for those who killed in war.

Under this system of belief any action against infidels was so full of merit that it obliterated the guilt of the most atrocious crimes. Fighting against infidels took rank with fastings, penitential discipline, visits to shrines, and alms giving, as meriting divine mercy. Thus the crusading church did battle against any unbelievers, Moslems, Jews and heretics. At the same time religious zeal was often a mask for avarice and power. 'The church was to be the master of earth rather than the servant of heaven'. Chivalry and religion were fused in the common purpose of conquest. The sword and the cross were identical; the state might lawfully make war upon a heretic people which was spreading heresy, and upon a pagan people which prevented the preaching of the gospel. Religion and conquest were identical, religion provided the ideological justification for homicide and theft on a vast scale. The violence of the crusades was paralleled and even exceeded by the European witchcraze, which lasted over centuries.

Many people may have perished in the European witchcraze. Over the centuries this kind of belief combined with ideas of heresy lead to massive persecution and the murder of large segments of the population.

Cohn, in an enquiry into the European witch-hunt, puts it down to a specific fantasy of an inner society of antihumans engaged in abominable practices threatening the existence of society from within (Cohn, 1975). This collective fantasy, which focussed on the idea of the existence 'of a child-eating, orgiastic, Devil-worshipping sect' was the product of the Establishment, Monks, bishops and popes, kings and great nobles, orthodox theologians, inquisitors and magistrates -stalwarts of their law and their order. Witchcraft became a way

of rooting out dissidents, manorial dependents like old widows, any who stood in the way of the Church and the state in thought and deed. Those who opposed the expansionist elites through different worldviews perished. Any notion of cultural relativity was deeply threatening to a self-righteous and expanding state.

As Westermarck (1912) has noted, dissidents were often those who upheld the peaceful values of the Christian Church. Historians write as if this murderous passion for destroying the pagan, the 'Other' declined. Witchcraft accusations may have declined around the mid seventeenth century in Europe, but greed and the bloodthirst for the demonic found rich pastures abroad in the expansion of Europe. The inhumanity to members of different cultures was a logical extension of crusades and the European witchcraze. As Galeano writes:

*America was the vast kingdom of the Devil, its redemption impossible or doubtful; but the fanatical mission against the natives heresy was mixed with the fever that the New World treasures stirred in the conquering hosts" (Galeano, 1973, 23).*

Non-Christian natives were by definition allied to the demonic, evil and inhuman category of beings. Bodley (1975) estimates 50 million tribal people perished between 1780 and 1930. The murder of Latin American Indians began much earlier of course; the foundation of this exploration and extermination was a categorization of Otherness.

Otherness and projection of evil, the Satanizing of the victim seem inevitable components of state formation.

In the twentieth century these crusading murderous tendencies have reached new heights of perfection culminating in the holocaust of the Second World War (Kenrick and Puxon, 1972). Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only possible by a similar kind of exclusion - as a race beyond the pale with antihuman characteristics. The Japanese, as much as anything else, were punished for having different definitions of conduct and contrasting concepts of the person.

The pathologising of the 'Other' is a necessary component of the most bestial human behaviour, stripping away the last vestiges of civilized behaviour, appealing to the basest bigotry and ignorance and tearing away the rules and conveniences of war that have so frequently governed face to face conflict between men, creating groups of people to whom the rules of conduct including the rules of war cease to apply (Hirst and Wolley, 1982). Because of their imagined crimes they cease to be seen as human beings and as a consequence may be submitted even in the imagination to the most mind-defying inhuman acts.

The main point here is that the premise of the possibility of nuclear war could only be based on a prior pathologising of the enemy by the attribution of all possible means of evil onto that enemy. Without this dehumanizing ideology even nuclear retaliation would be inconceivable. It is only possible to consider such an act against something so absolutely evil that it no longer shares the remotest resemblance to a human being. It would appear that the capacity to stereotype large masses of the population prior to their extermination is preceded by, or highly correlated with, the technological means of their removal. As Blackett in Sommer 1986: 159-160 said: '*Once a nation base's its security on an absolute weapon, such as the atom bomb, it becomes psychologically necessary to believe in an absolute enemy.*'

## PROJECTION AND ENMITY

The most serious problem of maintaining a constant state of armed readiness and a defensive posture is that it maintains the very conditions in one's own and the enemy's society that one wishes to avoid. May writes that William Fulbright pointed out how the Cuban missile and U-2 cruises were interpreted as aggressive acts and the USA responded accordingly; subsequently Khrushchev, who sought friendly relations with the United States was deposed by more Hawkish generals. *'Nations, in their misreading of the motives of other nations, can do what the paranoid patient does: they can work against their own interests because of their projection and aggression'* (May, 1972, 186).

Each side is thus engaged in the social construction of a system of meaning which constantly reaffirms its worst fears. In this example it could have made as much sense, as May says, to perceive the Russians as acting from fear rather than aggression. Given Russian losses in the Second World War and their encirclement by missiles this could be a reasonable alternative to consider.

Since 1917 the West has often acted in such a way as to confirm Russian fears and therefore ensure itself the closed nature of Russian society. The most important part of this dispute about the social construction of reality is that the chief negative characteristics of the Russian social system as perceived by the West may indeed be the creation of the West and vice versa. Internally in the West the fear of communism has led to primitive witch-hunts and externally to the labelling of a whole nation as an empire of evil. Each side's worst characteristics are thereby maintained by fear and projection.

## PREMISE OF DETERRENCE AND PEACE

One of the most flimsy defenses of nuclear deterrence is that it has maintained the peace since 1945. We say that weapons must not be used, that they are only a deterrent; yet at the same time we must convince the other of new possible use by creating cleverer and cleverer weapons that are able to avoid the detection of the enemy. We thus convince the enemy that we are as evil and malevolent as he first thought. The presence of nuclear weapons confirms the hideousness of the enemy and is a direct cause of war. This reciprocal paranoia of the Cold War has fanned the flames of all the repression and proxy wars in the respective political spheres of the great powers.

Western wars against peoples in the Third World are considered pardonable in face of the perceived threat of Communist domination. Russia rationalizes its behaviour in crushing dissent in satellite countries under its domination. Each side views its side as defense and the others defense as belligerence.

At another level the spiralling economic cost of the arms race, particularly in poor countries, has had disastrous economic effects. An important point here is that modern weaponry not only impoverishes but also stifles the development of freedom and creates the conditions of fear which feeds on itself. The use of money for weapons instead of welfare creates the conditions for opposition (Sivard, 1980, 1985).

The channelling of much needed development funds to weapons is in itself a direct source of dissent, internal revolution and internal repression. The unrest serves to confirm the paranoia, which feeds the arms which cause the poverty which causes the unrest. The poor are robbed to arm the nation against its collective nightmares. The education, hospitals, food which might act as a balm to nations troubled by violence are denied.

The social deprivation and distortion, which is a consequence of projection, feeds the flames of the projective system, which is its cause. The weapons portray the bearer's inner state of mind more than representing real threat. In the nuclear age this defensiveness is more absurd.

The Cold War is a system of primitive thought and projection which is worsened by each new phase in the arms race. It is a function of witchcraft accusations to define group boundaries and solidarity. The fears and hostilities of the Cold War function in a similar way. Thompson suggests that in the Cold War; 'Both adversaries need to maintain a hostile ideological position, as a means of internal bonding of discipline' (Thompson, 1982, 23).

I suggest that the situation is more complex than that since the behaviour exhibited in the Cold War contains embedded attitudes and ritual oppositions from the past. Indeed, although these fears unite in some sense, they also through an increasing burden on citizens fan the flames and internal dissent and threaten the state from within. By building up our defenses far and beyond any reasonable necessity we create the conditions of our own paranoia; we resemble a man advancing towards the enemy holding a gun at his head and threatening to shoot. Like Kafka's Vole we are so well defended we are totally vulnerable. Heretics and dissidents pay the price in both systems. And projection makes prisoners of us all.

#### THE PREMISE OF NUCLEAR 'TERRORISM'

One of the premises of nuclear weapons is that they deter nuclear wars; their justification rests however on their potential use. Many writers have noted that a realistic deterrent must be incorporated into war plans. The presence of a nuclear deterrent is therefore a most grotesque piece of terrorism and an unforgivable piece of global risk-taking. Nuclear weapons are a direct source of conflict, their threatened use even in retaliation would be an absolute act of wickedness as well as an irrevocable act of folly. Genocide, nor complicity in genocide, should not, under any circumstances, be an instrument of national policy.

Condoning the threat of nuclear retaliation is totally bereft of any notion of morality. Aside from all other considerations the governments, which take part in maintaining the state of nuclear terror, have forfeited the right to expect decent standards of behaviour from their own citizens. Governments cry out against terrorism when they have no standards of morality of their own to protect: a hijacker threatens only one aeroplane, nuclear states and nuclear allies threaten the whole spaceship earth and the rights of unborn generations. Internal unrest and growing violence stem not only from the economic and social distortions of the arms race but also from the very immorality of the weapons themselves. Deterrence rests on the potential use of nuclear weapons, any use of which would lead to the unleashing of firepower 6000 times that of World War 11 (Willens, 1984). Thus nuclear terrorism places an intolerable burden of fear on us all.

#### THE THREAT OF IMPENDING DISASTER

A further premise of nuclearism is that and each new level of chimerical threat is an acceptable condition of existence.<sup>7</sup> Research continues to show that children and young people are increasingly despairing about their prospects of survival in a nuclear world. The threat of nuclear war is one of the chief causes of suicide of young people.

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<sup>7</sup> A most extraordinary feature of this situation is the way that each new phase in the arms race is regarded as normal so that reductions to a previous phase of nuclear terror is seen an advance (see Schell, 1984).

Cynicism is replacing idealism as a natural phase of youthful development. Under these conditions personal development and choice is as distorted as the present becomes an intense substitute for an unreliable future. On its own the destruction of hope and optimism is too high a price to pay.

How we have reached this situation of civilized madness is of course extremely complex. Although modern states may be accused of all kinds of contemporary wickedness the danger lies in the way systems of thought and action become embedded during the process of evolution. The arms race carries with it the emotional and intellectual baggage of many centuries of systemic evolution. This process continues into the present, and disengagement is extremely difficult because of the modern bureaucratic apparatus of the state, which includes the arms control and producing agencies. At the same time weapon systems develop, it is increasingly possible to get snarled up in the technological expertise apparently required to discuss disarmament.

Intrinsic to this system of behaviour is the cybernetic feedback of paranoia, each action being met with an equal and opposite reaction as long as mutual defensiveness is maintained. We have overcapitalised centuries of stupidity. At the heart of the Cold War, especially in the complicity of the citizens, in a projective system not very different at all from witch fears of the past.

#### AGAINST PROJECTION

The mode of thought dominating the Cold War relies on ignorance and fear and differs little from patterns of hostility between individuals. The cure is the same. The more knowledge we have of the 'Other' and the more communication there is between us the less we have to fear and the more possible are friendly relations. Firstly I suggest an international peace corps exchange between Iron Curtain countries and the West. Secondly I propose that disarmament should begin with one missile at a time. Because of the nature of the projective system large reductions in arms is deeply threatening. I propose we freeze all future developments and destroy one missile at a time on a tit-for-tat basis in televised public ceremonies of celebration.

What I also propose that we dismantle the structures of enmity and replace them with an unparalleled increase in international communication during IYP and after. There has been a vast increase in the possibility of international communication, which has paralleled improvements in military technology. We should turn the technology that threatens us with extinction to our advantage. The technology exists for international networking on a vast scale prefigured by McLuhan's term the 'global village'. The two main instruments used would be international television networking and modern communication. The Geldorf experiment may not have altered the social structures of society but it did two very important things; it showed how quickly an international network of television communication could be set up, and secondly, and most importantly, it raised the hopes and aspirations of millions of young people around the world.

During the International Year of Peace I suggest that the same national television stations continue to remain open on weekly basis, if necessary under government subsidy. The same network should be used to broadcast feature documentaries about cultures on either side of the East West divide and they also be used as open forums by means of which members of one culture may quiz members of another. In the international scheme the major parties should be the Soviet Union and America and the other nuclear-armed states. One particular advantage of this system of international communication is that it cuts across official levels of interpretation.

Alongside the global network of twinning audiovisual communications through television and telephone using new technology there should be a crash programme in films, which enhance international understanding. Television companies in the west should be asked to broadcast at least 25 percent of their programming to films commissioned to remove barriers of ignorance. Although television stations programme managers and newsreaders would be involved in this process it is essential that ordinary people have access to each other. Television world network should be public access. In particular children's questions and appeals should be answered across cultures and within cultures.

Part of this scheme for IYP would be that each of the nuclear nations undertake a national children's TV/ radio question and lobby session. Local stations can network with the capitol to provide feedback to children chosen to represent their district. Children have a right to ask for a meaningful notion of posterity. Our new technology provides a way of doing so.

## AUDIO VISUAL COMMUNICATION

The networking should include at the very least two or three hours of top level audio-visual communication between Reagan and Gorbachev each week. There is no more important issue than global survival and both leaders could show how serious they are by committing themselves in this way. Other politicians in the west could be twinned with politicians in the Eastern bloc. Workers and their counterparts in East and West should be paired off in a similar fashion. In other areas of the world, in particular where conflict is ripe, such audiovisual communications systems between opponents could be subsidised by a special UN fund.

At another level administrative districts, cities, councils and schools should be twinned so that every Russian, East German, North Korean child and adult i.e. people living in the flashpoint areas of the world, would be in direct communication with partners in the west.

This mode of direct communication would in the first place be through computer modem systems via the telephone. The marvellous thing about this system is its immediacy, which is a complete change from the past and the dreadful slowness of postal communications. It is also possible to send modified visual accompaniment via video cameras.'

Modern computer technology revolutionizes the possibility of international communication so urgently needed to counteract the fears generated by our projective system.

Nuclear war is a moral, not a scientific or technical, problem. It stems from an insane system of thought which we should totally reject. We now have the means to escape from it and create the atmosphere of trust and cooperation necessary to set peace in motion and put to sleep the 'dogs of war'.

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